vCJD TEXAS CDC Emerging Infectious Diseases May 2015 Baylor College of Medicine Neuroscience 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance
vCJD TEXAS CDC Emerging Infectious Diseases May 2015 Baylor College of
Medicine Neuroscience 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights
need for continued surveillance
CDC: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 21, No. 5, May 2015 Baylor College
of Medicine Neuroscience 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights
need for continued surveillance
CDC: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 21, No. 5, May 2015
By Newsroom America Feeds at 10:55 am Eastern
Highlights: "Emerging Infectious Diseases", Vol. 21, No. 5, May 2015
* *
The articles of interest summarized below will appear in the May 2015
issues of "Emerging Infectious Diseases," CDC’s monthly peer-reviewed public
health journal. This issue will feature vectorborne infections.
* *
Recent US Case of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease—Global Implications,*
Atul Maheshwari et al.
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) is a rare neurologic disease that
has no cure and is always fatal. Onset of illness takes many years to develop
after initial exposure to the infectious organism. Emergence of this disease has
been linked to consumption of contaminated beef from the United Kingdom during
1980–1996. In the United States, only 4 cases are known to have occurred. The
source of exposure for the first 3 patients was probably consumption of beef
while in the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia, but the source of the most recent
infection, in 2012, is less clear. This patient had lived in the United States
for 14 years before becoming ill, but the evidence indicates that this patient’s
exposure to contaminated beef occurred outside the United States more than a
decade before onset of his illness. He had never stayed in the United Kingdom,
France, or Saudi Arabia. He had, however, lived in 3 countries (Kuwait, Russia,
and Lebanon) where he was most likely infected given the number of years the
patient spent there and the amount of British beef imported from the UK during
that time. His case highlights the persistent risk for acquiring this illness in
unsuspected geographic locations and the need for continued global tracking and
awareness.
Baylor College of Medicine =Baylor College of Medicine News =Neuroscience
=2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued
surveillance
Dipali Pathak (713) 798-4710 Houston, TX - Apr 16, 2015 share 2014 case of
human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance
The identification of a patient who died from variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease, the human form of “mad cow disease”, in Houston last year demonstrates
the need for continued global tracking and awareness of the prion disorder, said
an international consortium of physicians and public health experts led by those
at Baylor College of Medicine. The report appeared online in the journal
Emerging Infectious Diseases.
The case at a local hospital was the fourth to be confirmed in the United
States so far, said Dr. Atul Maheshwari, assistant professor in the departments
of neurology and neuroscience at Baylor and first author of the report, who
cared for the patient. The disease first emerged in the United Kingdom between
1980 and 1996, where it was linked to contaminated beef. The first three U.S.
cases were also thought to have occurred because the patients ate beef while in
the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia, which acquired much of its beef from the
United Kingdom.
The patient had lived in the United States for 14 years before becoming
ill. While he had never visited the United Kingdom, France or Saudi Arabia, he
had lived in Kuwait, Lebanon and Russia—all of which imported UK beef during the
time that the disease was at its greatest.
Maheshwari believes that the patient was exposed to the contaminated beef
outside the United States more than a decade before he became sick. There is
also no evidence that this patient transmitted the disease to anyone else.
“This article will alert physicians to the possibility that patients might
have this illness, even though they were exposed over 10 years ago,” he
said.
Others who took part in this research include Alicia Parker, Aarthi Ram,
Clay Goodman and Joseph S. Kass, all of Baylor; Michael Fischer of Texas
Department of State Health Services: Pierluigi Gambetti and Yvonne Cohen of Case
Western Reserve University School of Medicine in Cleveland, Ohio; Claudio Soto
and Luis Concha-Marambio of The University of Texas Medical School at Houston;
Ermias D. Belay, Ryan A. Maddox and Lawrence B. Schonberger of the federal
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia; Simon Mead of
the London Institute of Neurology in the United Kingdom; and Haitham M. Hussein
of HealthPartners Clinics & Services in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Greetings,
In my opinion, with the available science and history of the TSE prion in
North America, in many different species, the history on mad cows in Texas, the
history mad cow feed in Texas, the history on CJD in humans in Texas, the
assumption that the latest nvCJD case in Texas was from British Beef as the
number one assumption, is preposterous. There is as much, if not more risk
factor for this gentleman to have acquired the nvCJD from a USA/TEXAS source, as
there is anywhere else in the world. In fact, I believe the BSE TSE Prion
disease originated in the USA.
I would kindly like to evaluate the latest science on the Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE sporadic Creutztfeldt Jakob Disease sCJD, and
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE, and it’s many different variants or
phenotypes i.e. the atypical TSE prion, and the history of mad cows and the
unusual cases of CJD TSE Prioin disease in Texas. ...
Thank You,
kind regards, terry
first, a bit of science on TME and deadstock downer cows, then the sporadic
CJD, simply meaning from unknown route and source. the cause is not known.
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding
Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult
mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or
dead dairy cattle...
Sunday, September 1, 2013
Evaluation of the Zoonotic Potential of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
We previously described the biochemical similarities between PrPres derived
from L-BSE infected macaque and cortical MM2 sporadic CJD: those observations
suggest a link between these two uncommon prion phenotypes in a primate model
(it is to note that such a link has not been observed in other models less
relevant from the human situation as hamsters or transgenic mice overexpressing
ovine PrP [28]). We speculate that a group of related animal prion strains
(L-BSE, c-BSE and TME) would have a zoonotic potential and lead to prion
diseases in humans with a type 2 PrPres molecular signature (and more
specifically type 2B for vCJD)
snip...
Together with previous experiments performed in ovinized and bovinized
transgenic mice and hamsters [8,9] indicating similarities between TME and
L-BSE, the data support the hypothesis that L-BSE could be the origin of the TME
outbreaks in North America and Europe during the mid-1900s.
snip...please see full text and more here ;
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Transmissible mink encephalopathy - review of the etiology
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/2009/07/transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.html
Saturday, December 01, 2007
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and
L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Sunday, December 10, 2006
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus
Macaque
"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"
2014 sporadic CJD
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical
similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype
at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and
another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].
snip...
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME)
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier
Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name:
Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI:
doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014
Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights &
permissions Article metrics
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
TEXAS MAD COW, the 2nd one that almost got away to.
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE THE BSE MRR
POLICY was born, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE.
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
THE TEXAS MAD COW THAT GOT AWAY 2004
USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system
(CNS)
According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS)
Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2
The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected
from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance
of BSE."
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week
staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a
request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an
APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant
to send the carcass for rendering.5
May 13,2004
Page 2
snip...
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week
staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a
request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an
APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant
to send the carcass for rendering.5
This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of
whether this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between
the number of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows
actually tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:
2004, highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however,
NO TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $
May 4, 2004
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor
for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison)...
FDA MAD COW FEED BAN NOTHING BUT INK ON PAPER
Note:
On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow
in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating
that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However,
because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will
remain available for viewing.
FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests
taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and
bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on
using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a
very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle. FDA
has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total,
five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited
material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note
that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to
contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle),
fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such
cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner,
"The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the
United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant
animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps,
like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live
ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of
protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE." Despite this negligible risk,
Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing
all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed
containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not
enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed
containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should
be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes that
Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that
resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working
closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the
multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the
food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to
ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA
as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals
comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
NEWS RELEASE
Texas Animal Health Commission
Box l2966 •Austin, Texas 78711 •(800) 550-8242• FAX (512) 719-0719 Linda
Logan, DVM, PhD
• Executive Director For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer,
at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
For Immediate Release-- Feed Contamination Issue Resolved by FDA
Although many of you may have heard the latest regarding the resolution of
the cattle feed contamination situation in Texas, I wanted to ensure that you
received this statement issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
agency in charge of regulating feed components. The FDA has said the cattle
involved are to be rendered and the material will not enter ruminant or human
food channels. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) will provided
assistance to the FDA as requested and needed. FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM
TEXAS FEED LOT Today (Tuesday, Jan. the Food and Drug Administration announced
the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of
containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's
1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results
indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed
to cattle. FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and
in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of
prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is
important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore
not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in
U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of
BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were
contaminated. According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease
out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any
ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with
other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation
of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series
of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE." Despite this negligible
risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily
purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal
feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will
not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume
feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and
should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes
that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error
that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by
working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that
the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting
the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all
concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue
working with USDA as well as state and local officials to ensure that companies
and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the
U.S. food supply. ---30--
Thursday, June 26, 2008 Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain
Prohibited Materials Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited
Materials
Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-020-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW
Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Peggy Riek
WASHINGTON, June 26, 2008 – Beltex Corporation, doing business as Frontier
Meats, a Fort Worth, Texas, establishment, is recalling approximately 2,850
pounds of fresh cattle heads which may contain specified risk materials (SRMs),
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service
announced today.
SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle
infected with BSE, as well as materials that are closely associated with these
potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human
food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.
The products subject to recall include: Cases of "BEEF WHOLE HEAD." Each
shipping package bears the establishment number "EST. 7041B" inside the USDA
mark of inspection, as well as a package code of "51904" or "63922."
The company is recalling all products packed between May 31, 2007, and June
24, 2008. These products were distributed to retail establishments and lunch
carts in the Dallas-Ft. Worth, Texas, area.
The problem was discovered by the State of Texas officials during a routine
inspection at a retail establishment.
Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact the
company Sales Department at (817) 624-1136.
Consumers with food safety questions can “Ask Karen,” the FSIS virtual
representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat
and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and
Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through
Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day.
#
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed Texas Firm Recalls
Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-028-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW
Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Roger Sockman
WASHINGTON, August 7, 2008 - Dallas City Packing, Inc., a Dallas, Texas,
establishment, is recalling approximately 941,271 pounds of cattle heads with
tonsils not completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that
require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service announced today.
Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed
from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues
that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely
associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits
SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE
agent.
The following products subject to recall include: Various weight boxes of
“2-BEEF HEAD.” Each shipping package bears the establishment number “EST. 156”
inside the USDA mark of inspection, as well as a packaging date between “2 05 7”
and “8 05 8” stamped on the side of the box. Various weight boxes of “3-BEEF
HEAD.” Each shipping package bears the establishment number “EST. 156” inside
the USDA mark of inspection, as well as a packaging date between “2 05 7” and “8
05 8” stamped on the side of the box. The company is recalling all products
packed between Feb. 5, 2007, and Aug. 5, 2008. These products were distributed
primarily to retail establishments in Texas as well as distribution centers in
California, Colorado, Louisiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Texas.
The problem was discovered by FSIS.
Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact company
President Alan Rubin or Vice President David Meyers at (214) 948-3901.
Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual
representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat
and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and
Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through
Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day.
#
USDA Recall Classifications Class I This is a health hazard situation where
there is a reasonable probability that the use of the product will cause
serious, adverse health consequences or death. Class II This is a health hazard
situation where there is a remote probability of adverse health consequences
from the use of the product. Class III This is a situation where the use of the
product will not cause adverse health consequences.
028-2008, Cattle Heads (Prohibited Materials) (SRMs) En Español PDF Aug 7,
2008
Thursday, June 26, 2008
*** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Friday, August 8, 2008
*** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
resolved ??? ($$$)
we are still feeding cows to cows in 2013-2014, see OAI’s in link below,
December 13, 2013 and 2014.
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in
TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human
primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a
BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months
after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the
basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary
estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance
that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15
(7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar
PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number
of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of
disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally
judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr
Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1
gram triggered infection.
it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr
Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1
gram triggered infection.
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral
Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6;
Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique,
France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate
Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans
to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was
titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose
(MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to
assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the
disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of
BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study,
animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of
the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course
between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the
detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral
route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation
period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years).
However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop
simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE
in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route
using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.
P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim
McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre,
Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of
Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been
identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein
associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been
detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16
Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated
PrPres.
Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and
relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed
Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type
and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and
changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under
mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the
atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies
bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific
antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth
band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases
from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE
contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also
suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
***BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama)
and VPSPr PRIONPATHY ***
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
*** price of prion poker goes up again with this study. I strongly urge the
United States FDA et al to revisit their failed ruminant mad cow feed ban, where
still to this day, the feed ban does NOT include cervids. ...
Saturday, January 31, 2015
European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) are susceptible to Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE by Oral Alimentary route
*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ?
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the
rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected
feed.”
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base
that statement.”
*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS
THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM,
which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we
know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America
that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE
as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with
sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as
well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD
COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that
reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007,
TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN
THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow
feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous
g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the
USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R
Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter
dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc.,
Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb.
bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags,
Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall #
V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50
lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall #
V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall #
V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall #
V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by
telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall
is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with
ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall #
V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50
lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%,
Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to
20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall #
108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur,
AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is
complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with
ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006
09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6
kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL
FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL,
by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone
meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
please see full text ;
THIS IS WHEN THE MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTERS WERE WEEKLY, AND
INFORMATIVE FOR THE PUBLIC ;
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION
April 9, 2001 WARNING LETTER
01-PHI-12 CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Brian J. Raymond, Owner Sandy Lake Mills 26 Mill Street P.O. Box 117 Sandy
Lake, PA 16145 PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT
Tel: 215-597-4390
Dear Mr. Raymond:
Food and Drug Administration Investigator Gregory E. Beichner conducted an
inspection of your animal feed manufacturing operation, located in Sandy Lake,
Pennsylvania, on March 23, 2001, and determined that your firm manufactures
animal feeds including feeds containing prohibited materials. The inspection
found significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, code
of Federal Regulations, part 589.2000 - Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant
Feed. The regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification
of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) . Such deviations cause products being
manufactured at this facility to be misbranded within the meaning of Section
403(f), of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found failure to label your swine feed with the required
cautionary statement "Do Not Feed to cattle or other Ruminants" The FDA suggests
that the statement be distinguished by different type-size or color or other
means of highlighting the statement so that it is easily noticed by a purchaser.
In addition, we note that you are using approximately 140 pounds of
cracked corn to flush your mixer used in the manufacture of animal feeds
containing prohibited material. This flushed material is fed to wild game
including deer, a ruminant animal. Feed material which may potentially contain
prohibited material should not be fed to ruminant animals which may become part
of the food chain.
The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of deviations from
the regulations. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use,
you are responsible for assuring that your overall operation and the products
you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. We have enclosed
a copy of FDA's Small Entity Compliance Guide to assist you with complying with
the regulation... blah, blah, blah...
SPONTANEOUS
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
*** spontaneous atypical BSE ???
if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of
atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$
As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been
reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.
so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases
in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+
cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with
any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical
BSE investigations
LAST _documented_ MAD COW IN USA, IN CALIFORNIA, WAS ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE
BSE TSE PRION DISEASE
Thursday, February 20, 2014
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate
Model
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE
in these countries. ***
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
full text ;
atypical L-type BASE BSE
However, a BSE expert said that consumption of infected material is the
only known way that cattle get the disease under natural conditons.
*** “In view of what we know about BSE after almost 20 years experience,
contaminated feed has been the source of the epidemic,” said Paul Brown, a
scientist retired from the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and
Stroke. BSE is not caused by a microbe. It is caused by the misfolding of the
so-called “prion protein” that is a normal constituent of brain and other
tissues. If a diseased version of the protein enters the brain somehow, it can
slowly cause all the normal versions to become misfolded. It is possible the
disease could arise spontaneously, though such an event has never been recorded,
Brown said.
*** What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the
rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected
feed.” The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul
Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently
from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which
to base that statement.”
ATYPICAL BSE CASES AND FEED THERE FROM ;
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE
in these countries. ***
2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE BASE CALIFORNIA ‘confirmed’ Saturday, August 4,
2012
*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
(atypical L-type BASE BSE)
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
2015
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2015 9:17 AM
To: BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG
Subject: [BSE-L] Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed
Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary
Comment
Comment from Terry Singeltary This is a Comment on the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) Notice: Draft Guidance for Industry on Ensuring Safety of
Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm; Availability
For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon
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Comment View document:
Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed
On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment
Greetings FDA et al,
I wish to comment on Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed
Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180.
Once again, I wish to kindly bring up the failed attempt of the FDA and the
ruminant to ruminant mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997. This feed ban is still
failing today, as we speak. Even more worrisome, is the fact it is still legal
to feed cervids to cervids in the USA, in fact, the FDA only _recommends_ that
deer and elk considered to be of _high_ risk for CWD do not enter the animal
food chain, but there is NO law, its only voluntary, a recipe for a TSE prion
disaster, as we have seen with the ruminant to ruminant feed ban for cattle,
where in 2007, one decade post August 1997 mad cow feed ban, where in 2007
10,000,000 POUNDS OF BANNED BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL WHEN OUT INTO
COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. Since 2007, these BSE feed ban rules have been breached
time and time again. tons and tons of mad cow feed went out in Alabama as well,
where one of the mad cows were documented, just the year before in 2006, and in
2013 and 2014, breaches so bad (OAI) Official Action Indicated were issued.
those are like the one issued where 10 million pounds of banned blood laced meat
and bone meal were fed out.
What is the use of having a Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal
Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180, if it cannot be
enforced, as we have seen with a mandatory ruminant to ruminant feed ban?
I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to
make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this
should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following
reasons...
======
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21
CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from
deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to
feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used
for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high
risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed
system.
***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
======
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer
and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 0500 EMC 1
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT SUBMISSION ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
*** See attached file(s) No documents available. Attachments View All (1)
Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm
Terry Singeltary Comment View Attachment:
Sunday, April 5, 2015
*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed
On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***
Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. This is a Comment on the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products
For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon
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Comment View document: Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from
the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA
and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is
any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just
saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present
mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?
North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species
(excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and
or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented
evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine
spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just
not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid
CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type
BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to
date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical
Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different
strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow
case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC.
typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al),
and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical
Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid
populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk
assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to
trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day
December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats
the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries
throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated
to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the
OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion
disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type
disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about
money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating
disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure,
sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion
disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its
all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the
infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$
the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing
but ink on paper.
for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and
that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE
GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all
TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk
assessments be made stronger than before.
lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to
America.
Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest
year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases
dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to
date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad
cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the
number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the
USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in
2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD
COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in
my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow
disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE
mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.
Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)
Country/Year
snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA
triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease.
...TSS No documents available. Attachments View All (1) Docket No.
APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and
Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:
Saturday, November 10, 2012
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk
Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
*** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
Friday, August 8, 2008
*** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the
tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92
BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent
application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas
represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA
provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various
injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation
revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a
computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the
service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was
placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in
restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports
to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska
cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska
ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle
including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow
Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections
of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about
feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for
laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to
the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation
by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE
inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his
reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he
submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year
term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in restitution.
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for
specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over
SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are
completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602)
525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD
COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of
Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel
Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease
relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without
that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at
risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their
continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm
Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government
funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004,
Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from
cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The
Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty
months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous
system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle.
Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per
obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle
Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow
disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the
sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm
Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that
Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted
Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or
caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in
order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified
corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the
extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have
jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its
place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to
effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect,
obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not
subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests
to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not
subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s
testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA
that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify,
internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats
was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from
cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to
fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads
prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for
the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence,
Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those
guidelines in determining a sentence.
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The
investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE
NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
WE can only hope that this is a single incident. BUT i have my doubts. I
remember when the infamous TOKEN Purina Feed Mill in Texas was feeding up to 5.5
grams of potentially and probably tainted BANNED RUMINANT feed to cattle, and
the FDA was bragging at the time that the amount of potentially BANNED product
was so little and the cattle were so big ;
"It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in
origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no
evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the
feed were contaminated."
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. ... FDA's
investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into
"meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was
able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by
the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
WE now know all that was a lie. WE know that literally Thousands of TONS
of BANNED and most likely tainted product is still going out to commerce. WE
know now and we knew then that .005 to a gram was lethal. WE know that CWD
infected deer and elk, scrapie infected sheep, BSE and BASE infected cattle have
all been rendered and fed back to livestock (including cattle) for human and
animal consumption.
Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the
CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'',
and this was on March 15, 2006 ;
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National
Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an
expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question
was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected
seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector
general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before
2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr.
Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous
System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal
feeds
Animal
Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone
meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal
blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and other meal,
hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and animal animals
digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk
Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and
undried processed animal waste products
snip...
Conclusions
Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the
past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed
formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may
result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal
feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for
consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed
ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics,
metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant
bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting
animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human
health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections
(antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing
chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide
range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding
practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level
concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included
in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is
conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on
retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked
to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to
conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify
the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with
animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient
data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides
those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding
practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of
antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the
nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has
been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed,
which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al.
2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these
research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United
States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific
amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are
incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered
animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust
surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic
agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from farm to fork” to
human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among
feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health
officials.
REFERENCES...snip...end
Sapkota et al. 668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health
Perspectives
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine
Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December
4, 2013
TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD
COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were
wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on
paper $$$
full text ;
Friday, January 23, 2015
Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources
and relaxing the mad cow ban $
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL (SRM) CONTROL VERIFICATION TASK FSIS NOTICE 70-13
10/30/13
*** Singeltary Submission
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98
*** FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY ***
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada
"Three of four possible manufacturers supplying a protein supplement likely fed
to the animal could have included meat and bone meal (MBM) as an ingredient in
its formulation. One of these manufacturers was able to confirm usage of meat
and bone meal in supplements and confirm a source of MBM to be one common to
previous BSE investigations."
USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1981 - 1989
USA = 496
CANADA = 198
*add 14 to 198 as last UK import to Canada, 14 in 1990
HERE is another look at all the imports for both the USA and Canada of UK
live cattle and greaves exports ;
UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96
USA 697 LIVE CATTLE
CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE
UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 -
1995
USA 24 TONS
CANADA 83 TONS
HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS
Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.??? From:
S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000 To:
flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification
Requested)
Terry
Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade
purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals
(including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves. UK exports of this to
the US are listed below:
Country Tonnes
1980
1981 12
1982
1983
1984 10
1985 2
1986
1987
1988
1989 20
1990
Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These
can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and
Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222). Best wishes Simon
Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C
============ END...TSS...2008============
LETS start with the UKBSEnvCJD only theory, lets look at UK exports to USA,
Canada, and Mexico. the imported only theory. ...
1994 UK EXPORTS BEEF VEAL USA , MEXICO $ CANADA ONLY other Countries list
in PDF file)
USA -------- TOTALS ''8'' TONS CANADA -- TOTALS ''29'' TONS
1995 UK EXPORT BEEF AND VEAL TO USA AND CANADA
USA ------- TOTALS ''358'' TONS
CANADA --TOTALS ''24'' TONS
BONE-IN BEEF AND VEAL
USA-------- TOTALS ''10'' TONS (i think this is part of the 358 tons
above?)
UK EXPORT OF LIKE CATTLE TO USA AND CANADA
1986 TO 1996 USA TOTAL = 1297
1986 TO 1996 CAN TOTAL = 299
UK EXPORT MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS DEC 1987
CANADA -- 64,526 KG
UK EXPORT OFFALS OF BOVINE ANIMALS FRESH CHILLED OR FROZEN OTHER THAN LIVER
DEC 1987 YTD
USA -- 45,943 KG
UK EXPORT MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMAL WITH BONE IN 1988
CANADA -- 4,163 KG
PREP OR PRES MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS CUMULATIVE TO DEC 1988
USA -------- 28,609 KG CANADA -- 22,044 KG
MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS WITH BONE IN CUMULATIVE TO ANUAL 1989
USA -------- 17,880 KG MEXICO---- 33,444 KG
BONELESS MEAT OF BOVINE 1989
USA --------111,953 KG CANADA---1,800 KG MEXICO --- 1,143,387 KG
EDIBLE OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS 1989
USA -------- 19,980 KG MEXICO--- 31,244 KG
MORE........
MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS BONELESS 1990
USA 146,443
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS, USA, CANADA, AND MEXICO
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk
(GBR) of the United States of America (USA)
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the
likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE,
pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses
the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached
domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid
eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an
internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and
bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal
challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports
from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly)
into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and
grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported
MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk
increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk
countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in
rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the
probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk
(GBR) of Canada
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in
Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected
with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering
the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties
and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle
imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and
therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that
imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to
an internal challenge in the early 90s.
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and
were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle
imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued
to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected
by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the
risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE
risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is
confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains
unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional
external challenges occur.
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR)
of Mexico
Last updated: 8 September 2004 Publication Date: 20 August 2004
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of
one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as
clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as
assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached
domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore
led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990s. It is possible that
imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads
to an internal challenge around 1993.
It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of
imported ‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live
‘at - risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is
maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made
stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from
approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained
internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system.
EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III,
i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is likely to increase due
to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable
system.
Subject: MBM (MEAT AND BONE MEAL) imports from the United Kingdom to???
'EVERYWHERE', including the U.S. Date: April 10, 2000 at 1:31 pm PST
69. On 14 February 1990, Mr Meldrum wrote a letter to the Chief Veterinary
Officers of a number of countries. [76] On 15 February 1990, Mrs Attridge and
other officials were sent a copy of the letter of 14 February 1990 and a list of
the countries to which it had been sent. They were stated to be the countries
which had imported ruminant based meat and bone meal from the United Kingdom.
The countries listed were Norway; Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Nigeria, Thailand, South Africa, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South
Korea, Japan, Canada, USA, Turkey, Kenya, Malta, Libera, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, Curacao, Finland.[77]
The letter from Mr Meldrum included the following:
‘Although we have kept the Office Internationale des Epizooties (OIE) fully
informed about this new disease, and they will shortly be disseminating
information and recommendations to member countries, I am writing to you on a
personal basis to ensure that you are aware of all the developments in relation
to BSE, including its likely cause. The majority of our findings have now been
published in the Veterinary Record.’[78] 70. On 20 February 1990, Dr Pickles
wrote to Ms Verity (APS/CMO). Dr Pickles’ minute included the following:
‘1. Mr Meldrum is arguing that MAFF have already taken all the necessary
and responsible steps to warn importing countries of the BSE dangers in UK meat
and bone meal. Yet the action taken so far overseas suggest the message has not
got through, or where it has this has been late. The first nation that woke up
to the danger did so a year after our own feed ban. It seems even now several EC
countries neither ban our imports or the general feeding of ruminant protein. It
also seems the OIE and CVO have yet to inform the rest of the world.
2. I do not see how this can be claimed to be ‘responsible’. We do not need
an expert group of the Scientific Veterinary Committee to tell us British meat
and bone meal is unsafe for ruminants. I fail to understand why this cannot be
tackled from the British end which seems to be the only sure way of doing it,
preferably by banning exports. As CMO says in his letter of 3 January ‘surely it
is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible
for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.’’[79] 71. Dr
Pickles attached a draft reply for the CMO to send to Mr Meldrum. The draft
letter included the following:
‘I was pleased to hear of your action to inform nations overseas about the
causation of BSE and the measures needed to prevent infection in their own
cattle. But the evidence of action taken so far suggests other nations have not
fully appreciated the possible hazards from our meat and bone meal, since only a
few nations have either banned our imports or the more general feeding of
ruminant material. It is in the knowledge that several other nations have yet to
take adequate steps that I questioned whether we should be restricting exports.
Your reply does not convince me that everything possible has already been done.
[We are meeting on the 22nd February and our discussions are to include BSE. We
could debate this further then]. [We have discussed this matter further at our
recent meeting. Our view remains that restricting exports would be the right
course of action.]’[80] 72.
On 22 February 1990 Mr Andrews held a meeting with Sir Christopher France,
Sir Donald Acheson and Mr Heppell from the Department of Health;
Mr Dickinson and Mr Meldrum from MAFF were present. Mr Robinson (PS/Mr
Andrews) minuted Mr Dickinson on 27 February 1990 about this meeting.[81] The
minute stated in paragraph 18: ‘Sir Donald Acheson asked whether meat and bone
meal that was exported should be labelled. Mr Meldrum said that he had now
written to his opposite number in our trading partners. He had told them that
the UK had imposed a ban, and importing countries must make their own decisions.
We had not wanted to introduce a ban on exports since we were content to feed it
to pigs and poultry. He was certain that other countries were fully aware of the
situation in the UK.’ 73.
On 27 February 1990, Dr McInnes (PS/CMO) wrote to Dr Pickles. The minute
was entitled ‘BSE and exports of Meat and Bone Meal’ and contained the
following: ‘You very kindly provided a draft letter for CMO to sent to Mr
Meldrum on this subject. I understand from CMO that this was in fact discussed
at their recent meeting and CMO has therefore decided not to pursue this
question.’[82] 74.
When Dr Pickles gave oral evidence, the following exchange took place:
‘MR THOMAS: Do the points put forward by Mr Meldrum in that meeting in this
note answer the concerns you had put forward previously?
DR PICKLES: I do not think they do. MR THOMAS: Can I ask you to expand as
to why not?
DR PICKLES: He was reiterating the same arguments I had had previously. He
was certain other countries were fully aware of the situation in the UK, or
maybe their chief veterinary officers were. I was more concerned to know whether
the importers of MBM and their compounders and farmers knew about it.
MR THOMAS: Do you recall any discussion of the CMO's decision not to pursue
the question further?
DR PICKLES: I do not think I had discussion, no.’[83] 75.
A supplemental statement from Mr Meldrum includes the following: ‘… steps
were taken to ensure that information was provided on an international basis
about BSE and the control measures introduced in the UK, including the ruminant
feed ban. I was fully aware that the reports of all the meetings of the OIE
Commissions in the languages of the OIE were circulated to all the member
countries shortly after the meetings had taken place. Examples of countries
reacting to the information about BSE that was widely available can be seen in
letters dated 21st June, 1988 (YB88/6.21/15.1) and 3rd February, 1989
(YB89/2.3/5.1) from me to Israel's Director of Veterinary Services and Animal
Health, a letter dated 11th October, 1988 (YB88/10.11/4.1-4.4) from me to
Cyprus' Director of Veterinary Services, a letter dated 3rd February, 1989
(YB89/2.03/6.1) from me to Finland's Director of Veterinary Services and a
letter dated 6th December, 1988 (YB88/12.6/5.1-5.2)from Mr Hawkins to the Dairy
Farmers' Association of Japan.
I particularly wish to draw attention to the question and answer brief for
importing countries which is attached to the letter to Cyprus' Director of
Veterinary Services (YB88/10.11/4.2-4.4).
Also a minute dated 3rd October, 1988 (YB88/10.3/7.1-7.4) from Mr Crawford
to me describes a visit by Mr Crawford to the USA to meet staff at the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service. As item number 7 of the minute shows, Mr
Crawford gave a summary of BSE and the measures taken by MAFF to ‘investigate
and eradicate it’(YB88/10.3/7.3).’[84] 76. A supplemental statement provided by
Mr Meldrum includes a section relating to notification of the ruminant feed ban
to non-EC countries which concludes with the following:
‘… it can be seen that non-EC countries were kept informed of the existence
of BSE and the hypothesis on the role of meat and bone meal in the disease and
of the subsequent introduction of the ruminant feed ban in the UK. As I
maintained throughout the period from when I took over as CVO (1st June, 1988)
until my letter to the CVOs of third countries on 14th February, 1990
(YB90/2.15/3.1-3.4), importing third countries (both EC and non-EC) had
sufficient information to make their own decisions as to whether or not to
impose their own restrictions on imports of meat and bone meal from the UK.
*** It is also pertinent to note that so far as I am aware none of the 25
countries to whom I wrote in February 1990 banned the import of animal protein
from the UK and none complained that they had not been informed of BSE through
the OIE. ***
This is hardly surprising because one of the main reasons for the existence
of the OIE is to disseminate information about outbreaks of disease amongst the
member countries. I had great faith in the OIE and believe that its record in
the dissemination of information about outbreaks of both established and
emerging diseases is above criticism.’[85]
‘’AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it
appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about
trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science
based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization.’’
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
OIE and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reinforce Collaboration
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD
OTHERS
BEEF AND VEAL
LIVE CATTLE
FATS
EMBRYOS
GELATIN ETC
SEMEN
MEAT
Wednesday, April 16, 2008 MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports
from UK to USA vs Canada
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report
August 2013
*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada
seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***
Sunday, October 13, 2013
*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012
Tuesday, April 01, 2014
*** Questions linger in U.S. CJD cases 2005, and still do in 2014
Monday, March 29, 2010
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN
AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
URGENT, PLEASE NOTE ;
>>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods
where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them
for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would
euthanize the cattle. <<<
CJD NE TEXAS CLUSTER
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Northeast Texas
J.A. Rawlings,*1 K.A. Hendricks1, O.M. Nuno1, D.A. Brown1, D.A. Evans2,
Texas Department of Health, 1Austin and 2Tyler, T
exas Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD), a transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy, is caused by prions composed of proteinaceous material devoid of
nucleic acid. CJD occurs sporadically (generally 1 case/1,000,000 population per
year) in older patients (average age of 65) and is characterized by rapidly
progressive dementia, accompanied by severe muscle spasms and incoordination.
Death usually occurs within 3 to 12 months (average 7 months). CJD activity in
Texas, which has a population of nearly 19 million, appeared to be typical. The
statewide death rate for 1995 and 1996 was just under 1/1,000,000. In April of
1997, the Texas Department of Health became aware of an increased number of
possible CJD cases in a 23-county area of NE Texas with a population of just
over one million. After review of medical and pathology records, four patients
were identified with definite classic CJD and three were identified with
probable CJD. Dates of death for the eight patients were from April, 1996
through mid-July 1997. The patients were from 46 through 65 years of age; four
were male and three were female. A case-control study to identify risks for CJD
in NE Texas has been initiated.
we get them young cases of tse prion disease in Texas, that is not related
to anything $$$ money and politics will buy anything, especially junk science...
sporadic ffi and sporadic gss ;
NOT THIS CASE !!! but another one a while back in Texas...see ;
We report a case of a 33-year-old female who died of a prion disease for
whom the diagnosis of sFI or FFI was not considered clinically. Following death
of this patient, an interview with a close family member indicated the patient's
illness included a major change in her sleep pattern, corroborating the reported
autopsy diagnosis of sFI.
sporadic FFI or nvCJD Texas style ???
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance in Texas
Sunday, July 11, 2010
CJD or prion disease 2 CASES McLennan County Texas population 230,213 both
cases in their 40s
***In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for
atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time
for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific
information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose
the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by
the same protective measures.
Monday, May 19, 2014
Variant CJD: 18 years of research and surveillance
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health
Crisis
full text with source references ;
re-Human Prion Diseases in the United States
Posted by flounder on 01 Jan 2010 at 18:11 GMT
Views & Reviews
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
in the United States
Ermias D. Belay, MD, Ryan A. Maddox, MPH, Pierluigi Gambetti, MD and
Lawrence B. Schonberger, MD
+ Author Affiliations
From the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases (Drs. Belay and
Schonberger and R.A. Maddox), National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA; and National Prion Disease
Pathology Surveillance Center (Dr. Gambetti), Division of Neuropathology,
Institute of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to Dr. Ermias D. Belay, 1600
Clifton Road, Mailstop A-39, Atlanta, GA 30333.
26 March 2003
Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) CJD WATCH
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to
comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of
CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the
129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is
indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD
and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be
made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not
continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are
sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA
in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does
transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral
inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission
studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be
asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the
agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and
Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and
surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many
sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al.
JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1
reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)
has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported
cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that
misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of
persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although
only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination
necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD
reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be
reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL
TEXT
2 January 2000
British Medical Journal
U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as
well
15 November 1999
British Medical Journal
vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in
North America update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember,
the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been
documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical
Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these
TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals
for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the
trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been
immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only
enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the
UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to
continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a
multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e.,
surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics
etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and
the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every
state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without
further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to
spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the
reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO
age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge,
Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al
and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is
far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this
myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new
classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the
infected species, the source species, and then the route.
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier
Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name:
Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI:
doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014
Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights &
permissions Article metrics
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01 Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein
deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of
a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to
BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have
focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in
flocks across Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb...
2001
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01
Like lambs to the slaughter
31 March 2001
by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284.
FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a
degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary
was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded
an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by
chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of
campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is
caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on
sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across
Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.
Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no
evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means
that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have
overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.
Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They
injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from
French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the
monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of
brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same symptoms.
As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from
people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French
patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French
strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie
strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and
vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from
sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.
"The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been
epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute
for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys.
"You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not
there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie." In
the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were
dissimilar.
But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. "You would
not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only
some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the
mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of
scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.
People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion
protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has
found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each
type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously
deforms to produce sCJD.
But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing
prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as
it is in vCJD. "If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find
some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were
caused by infection."
There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence
elsewhere. Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people
died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried
animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary
if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have insisted.
Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human
disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more
virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather
than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than
we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through
contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.
Friday, February 20, 2015
APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays
2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease
Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015
Thursday, March 20, 2014
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION OF CERVID AND THE POTENTIAL FOR HUMAN
TRANSMISSION THEREFROM 2014
Tuesday, July 01, 2014
*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE, GAME FARMS, AND
POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS THERE FROM ***
Thursday, July 03, 2014
*** How Chronic Wasting Disease is affecting deer population and what’s the
risk to humans and pets? ***
Thursday
CWD TO HUMANS, AND RISK FACTORS THERE FROM (see latest science)
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
*** Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated
venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes
2005–2011
Friday, January 30, 2015
*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***
Sunday, April 12, 2015
*** Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2014 Annual Report ***
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/04/research-project-transmission.html
Saturday, April 11, 2015
*** ISU veterinary researchers study retinal scans as early detection
method for mad cow disease
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***
Monday, November 3, 2014
USA CJD TSE PRION UNIT, TEXAS, SURVEILLANCE UPDATE NOVEMBER 2014
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1
(October 7, 2014)
***6 Includes 11 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 19
inconclusive cases;
***7 Includes 12 (11 from 2014) cases with type determination pending in
which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.
***The sporadic cases include 2660 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (sCJD),
***50 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr)
***and 21 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI).
Thursday, January 15, 2015
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE
Prion: Case Report
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies
diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type
disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the
public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping
everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and
there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky
Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you
Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the
Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am
seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years
and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or
what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other
meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how
many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed
with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report ***
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
Towards an Age-Dependent Transmission Model of Acquired and Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to
disease etiology?
Sunday, July 06, 2014
Dietary Risk Factors for Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: A Confirmatory
Case-Control Study
Conclusions—The a priori hypotheses were supported.
*Consumption of various meat products may be one method of transmission of
the infectious agent for sCJD.
PLEASE REMEMBER ;
The Akron, Ohio-based CJD Foundation said the Center for Disease Control
revised that number in October of 2004 to about one in 9,000 CJD cases per year
in the population group age 55 and older.
HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ASKING REAL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO
ROUTE AND SOURCE OF THE TSE AGENT THAT KILLED YOUR LOVED ONE ???
if not, why not...
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
Friday, January 10, 2014
vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type
prion disease, what it ???
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential
Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3,
2014
Singeltary comment ;
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
KURU Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease
*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis VIDEO
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14,
2001 JAMA
snip...
2001-2002ish
greetings TSE PRION WORLD,
i am reminded of a few things deep throat told me years ago;
*** The most frightening thing I have read all day is the report of
Gambetti's finding of a new strain of sporadic cjd in young people.........
Dear God, what in the name of all that is holy is that!!! If the US has
different strains of scrapie..... why???? than the UK... then would the same
mechanisms that make different strains of scrapie here make different strains of
BSE... if the patterns are different in sheep and mice for scrapie..... could
not the BSE be different in the cattle, in the mink, in the humans....... I
really think the slides or tissues and everything from these young people with
the new strain of sporadic cjd should be put up to be analyzed by many, many
experts in cjd........ bse..... scrapie
Scrape the damn slide and put it into mice..... wait..... chop up the
mouse brain and and spinal cord........ put into some more mice..... dammit
amplify the thing and start the damned research..... This is NOT rocket
science... we need to use what we know and get off our butts and move.... the
whining about how long everything takes..... well it takes a whole lot longer if
you whine for a year and then start the research!!!
Not sure where I read this but it was a recent press release or something
like that: I thought I would fall out of my chair when I read about how there
was no worry about infectivity from a histopath slide or tissues because they
are preserved in formic acid, or formalin or formaldehyde..... for God's
sake........ Ask any pathologist in the UK what the brain tissues in the
formalin looks like after a year....... it is a big fat sponge... the agent
continues to eat the brain ...... you can't make slides anymore because the
agent has never stopped........ and the old slides that are stained with
Hemolysin and Eosin...... they get holier and holier and degenerate and
continue... what you looked at 6 months ago is not there........ Gambetti better
be photographing every damned thing he is looking at.....
***Okay, you need to know. You don't need to pass it on as nothing will
come of it and there is not a damned thing anyone can do about it. Don't even
hint at it as it will be denied and laughed at.......... USDA is gonna do as
little as possible until there is actually a human case in the USA of the
nvcjd........ if you want to move this thing along and shake the earth.... then
we gotta get the victims families to make sure whoever is doing the autopsy is
credible, trustworthy, and a saint with the courage of Joan of Arc........ I am
not kidding!!!! so, unless we get a human death from EXACTLY the same form with
EXACTLY the same histopath lesions as seen in the UK nvcjd........ forget any
action........ it is ALL gonna be sporadic!!! And, if there is a case.......
there is gonna be every effort to link it to international travel, international
food, etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. They will go so far as to find out if a sex
partner had ever traveled to the UK/europe, etc. etc. .... It is gonna be a
long, lonely, dangerous twisted journey to the truth. They have all the cards,
all the money, and are willing to threaten and carry out those threats.... and
this may be their biggest downfall...***
Thanks as always for your help. (Recently had a very startling revelation
from a rather senior person in government here.......... knocked me out of my
chair........ you must keep pushing. If I was a power person.... I would be
demanding that there be at least a million bovine tested as soon as possible and
agressively seeking this disease. The big players are coming out of the wood
work as there is money to be made!!!
In short: "FIRE AT WILL"!!! for the very dumb.... who's "will"! "Will be
the burden to bare if there is any coverup!"
again it was said years ago and it should be taken seriously.... BSE will
NEVER be found in the US!
As for the BSE conference call... I think you did agreat service to
freedom of information and making some people feign integrity... I find it scary
to see that most of the "experts" are employed by the federal government or are
supported on the "teat" of federal funds. A scary picture! I hope there is a
confidential panel organized by the new government to really investigate this
thing.
You need to watch your back........ but keep picking at them....... like a
buzzard to the bone... you just may get to the truth!!! (You probably have more
support than you know. Too many people are afraid to show you or let anyone else
know. I have heard a few things myself... you ask the questions that everyone
else is too afraid to ask.)
================================================
*** U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 SINGELTARY
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net
posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. | 10:59 AM
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