My Photo
Name:
Location: BACLIFF, Texas, United States

My mother was murdered by what I call corporate and political homicide i.e. FOR PROFIT! she died from a rare phenotype of CJD i.e. the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease i.e. sporadic, simply meaning from unknown route and source. I have simply been trying to validate her death DOD 12/14/97 with the truth. There is a route, and there is a source. There are many here in the USA. WE must make CJD and all human TSE, of all age groups 'reportable' Nationally and Internationally, with a written CJD questionnaire asking real questions pertaining to route and source of this agent. Friendly fire has the potential to play a huge role in the continued transmission of this agent via the medical, dental, and surgical arena. We must not flounder any longer. ...TSS

Saturday, April 18, 2015

vCJD TEXAS CDC Emerging Infectious Diseases May 2015 Baylor College of Medicine Neuroscience 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance

vCJD TEXAS CDC Emerging Infectious Diseases May 2015 Baylor College of Medicine Neuroscience 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance

 

 

CDC: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 21, No. 5, May 2015 Baylor College of Medicine Neuroscience 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance

 

CDC: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 21, No. 5, May 2015

 

By Newsroom America Feeds at 10:55 am Eastern

 


 

Highlights: "Emerging Infectious Diseases", Vol. 21, No. 5, May 2015

 

* *

 

The articles of interest summarized below will appear in the May 2015 issues of "Emerging Infectious Diseases," CDC’s monthly peer-reviewed public health journal. This issue will feature vectorborne infections.

 

* *

 

Recent US Case of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease—Global Implications,* Atul Maheshwari et al.

 

Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) is a rare neurologic disease that has no cure and is always fatal. Onset of illness takes many years to develop after initial exposure to the infectious organism. Emergence of this disease has been linked to consumption of contaminated beef from the United Kingdom during 1980–1996. In the United States, only 4 cases are known to have occurred. The source of exposure for the first 3 patients was probably consumption of beef while in the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia, but the source of the most recent infection, in 2012, is less clear. This patient had lived in the United States for 14 years before becoming ill, but the evidence indicates that this patient’s exposure to contaminated beef occurred outside the United States more than a decade before onset of his illness. He had never stayed in the United Kingdom, France, or Saudi Arabia. He had, however, lived in 3 countries (Kuwait, Russia, and Lebanon) where he was most likely infected given the number of years the patient spent there and the amount of British beef imported from the UK during that time. His case highlights the persistent risk for acquiring this illness in unsuspected geographic locations and the need for continued global tracking and awareness.

 


 

Baylor College of Medicine =Baylor College of Medicine News =Neuroscience =2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance

 

Dipali Pathak (713) 798-4710 Houston, TX - Apr 16, 2015 share 2014 case of human form of “mad cow disease” highlights need for continued surveillance

 

The identification of a patient who died from variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human form of “mad cow disease”, in Houston last year demonstrates the need for continued global tracking and awareness of the prion disorder, said an international consortium of physicians and public health experts led by those at Baylor College of Medicine. The report appeared online in the journal Emerging Infectious Diseases.

 

The case at a local hospital was the fourth to be confirmed in the United States so far, said Dr. Atul Maheshwari, assistant professor in the departments of neurology and neuroscience at Baylor and first author of the report, who cared for the patient. The disease first emerged in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1996, where it was linked to contaminated beef. The first three U.S. cases were also thought to have occurred because the patients ate beef while in the United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia, which acquired much of its beef from the United Kingdom.

 

The patient had lived in the United States for 14 years before becoming ill. While he had never visited the United Kingdom, France or Saudi Arabia, he had lived in Kuwait, Lebanon and Russia—all of which imported UK beef during the time that the disease was at its greatest.

 

Maheshwari believes that the patient was exposed to the contaminated beef outside the United States more than a decade before he became sick. There is also no evidence that this patient transmitted the disease to anyone else.

 

“This article will alert physicians to the possibility that patients might have this illness, even though they were exposed over 10 years ago,” he said.

 

Others who took part in this research include Alicia Parker, Aarthi Ram, Clay Goodman and Joseph S. Kass, all of Baylor; Michael Fischer of Texas Department of State Health Services: Pierluigi Gambetti and Yvonne Cohen of Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine in Cleveland, Ohio; Claudio Soto and Luis Concha-Marambio of The University of Texas Medical School at Houston; Ermias D. Belay, Ryan A. Maddox and Lawrence B. Schonberger of the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia; Simon Mead of the London Institute of Neurology in the United Kingdom; and Haitham M. Hussein of HealthPartners Clinics & Services in St. Paul, Minnesota.

 


 

Greetings,

 

In my opinion, with the available science and history of the TSE prion in North America, in many different species, the history on mad cows in Texas, the history mad cow feed in Texas, the history on CJD in humans in Texas, the assumption that the latest nvCJD case in Texas was from British Beef as the number one assumption, is preposterous. There is as much, if not more risk factor for this gentleman to have acquired the nvCJD from a USA/TEXAS source, as there is anywhere else in the world. In fact, I believe the BSE TSE Prion disease originated in the USA.

 

I would kindly like to evaluate the latest science on the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE sporadic Creutztfeldt Jakob Disease sCJD, and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE, and it’s many different variants or phenotypes i.e. the atypical TSE prion, and the history of mad cows and the unusual cases of CJD TSE Prioin disease in Texas. ...

 

Thank You,

 

kind regards, terry

 

first, a bit of science on TME and deadstock downer cows, then the sporadic CJD, simply meaning from unknown route and source. the cause is not known.

 

 

 

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

 

snip...

 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

 


 


 


 

Sunday, September 1, 2013

 

Evaluation of the Zoonotic Potential of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy

 

We previously described the biochemical similarities between PrPres derived from L-BSE infected macaque and cortical MM2 sporadic CJD: those observations suggest a link between these two uncommon prion phenotypes in a primate model (it is to note that such a link has not been observed in other models less relevant from the human situation as hamsters or transgenic mice overexpressing ovine PrP [28]). We speculate that a group of related animal prion strains (L-BSE, c-BSE and TME) would have a zoonotic potential and lead to prion diseases in humans with a type 2 PrPres molecular signature (and more specifically type 2B for vCJD)

 

snip...

 

Together with previous experiments performed in ovinized and bovinized transgenic mice and hamsters [8,9] indicating similarities between TME and L-BSE, the data support the hypothesis that L-BSE could be the origin of the TME outbreaks in North America and Europe during the mid-1900s.

 

snip...please see full text and more here ;

 

Tuesday, July 21, 2009

 

Transmissible mink encephalopathy - review of the etiology

 


 

Saturday, December 01, 2007

 

Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model

 


 

Sunday, December 10, 2006

 

Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME

 


 


 

Saturday, June 25, 2011

 

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

 

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

 


 

2014 sporadic CJD

 

***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.

 

***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.

 

*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].

 

snip...

 


 

Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far

 

*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.

 

*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010

 

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

 

First threat

 

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

 

*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

 

*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

snip...

 


 

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

 

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics

 

Abstract

 

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human ​prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 

Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance

 


 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

 TEXAS MAD COW, the 2nd one that almost got away to.

 

 THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE THE BSE MRR POLICY was born, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE.

 

 During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.

 


 

 THE TEXAS MAD COW THAT GOT AWAY 2004

 

USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system (CNS)

 

 According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS) Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2 The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance of BSE."

 

 The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5

 

 May 13,2004

 

 Page 2

 

 snip...

 

 The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5

 

 This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:

 


 

 2004, highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however, NO TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $

 

 May 4, 2004

 

 Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

 

 On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

 

 FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

 

 FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

 

 Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison)...

 


 

 FDA MAD COW FEED BAN NOTHING BUT INK ON PAPER

 

 Note:

 

 On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.

 

 FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

 

 Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle. FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated. According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE." Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

 


 

 NEWS RELEASE

 

Texas Animal Health Commission

 

Box l2966 •Austin, Texas 78711 •(800) 550-8242• FAX (512) 719-0719 Linda Logan, DVM, PhD

 

• Executive Director For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us

 

 For Immediate Release-- Feed Contamination Issue Resolved by FDA

 

 Although many of you may have heard the latest regarding the resolution of the cattle feed contamination situation in Texas, I wanted to ensure that you received this statement issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency in charge of regulating feed components. The FDA has said the cattle involved are to be rendered and the material will not enter ruminant or human food channels. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) will provided assistance to the FDA as requested and needed. FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT Today (Tuesday, Jan. the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle. FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated. According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE." Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA as well as state and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply. ---30--

 


 

 Thursday, June 26, 2008 Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

 

Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-020-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW

 

Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Peggy Riek

 

WASHINGTON, June 26, 2008 – Beltex Corporation, doing business as Frontier Meats, a Fort Worth, Texas, establishment, is recalling approximately 2,850 pounds of fresh cattle heads which may contain specified risk materials (SRMs), the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service announced today.

 

SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with BSE, as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.

 

The products subject to recall include: Cases of "BEEF WHOLE HEAD." Each shipping package bears the establishment number "EST. 7041B" inside the USDA mark of inspection, as well as a package code of "51904" or "63922."

 

The company is recalling all products packed between May 31, 2007, and June 24, 2008. These products were distributed to retail establishments and lunch carts in the Dallas-Ft. Worth, Texas, area.

 

The problem was discovered by the State of Texas officials during a routine inspection at a retail establishment.

 

Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact the company Sales Department at (817) 624-1136.

 

Consumers with food safety questions can “Ask Karen,” the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day.

 

#

 


 

Friday, August 8, 2008

 

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

 

941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

 

Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-028-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW

 

Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Roger Sockman

 

WASHINGTON, August 7, 2008 - Dallas City Packing, Inc., a Dallas, Texas, establishment, is recalling approximately 941,271 pounds of cattle heads with tonsils not completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service announced today.

 

Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.

 

The following products subject to recall include: Various weight boxes of “2-BEEF HEAD.” Each shipping package bears the establishment number “EST. 156” inside the USDA mark of inspection, as well as a packaging date between “2 05 7” and “8 05 8” stamped on the side of the box. Various weight boxes of “3-BEEF HEAD.” Each shipping package bears the establishment number “EST. 156” inside the USDA mark of inspection, as well as a packaging date between “2 05 7” and “8 05 8” stamped on the side of the box. The company is recalling all products packed between Feb. 5, 2007, and Aug. 5, 2008. These products were distributed primarily to retail establishments in Texas as well as distribution centers in California, Colorado, Louisiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Texas.

 

The problem was discovered by FSIS.

 

Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact company President Alan Rubin or Vice President David Meyers at (214) 948-3901.

 

Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day.

 

#

 

USDA Recall Classifications Class I This is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or death. Class II This is a health hazard situation where there is a remote probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product. Class III This is a situation where the use of the product will not cause adverse health consequences.

 


 

028-2008, Cattle Heads (Prohibited Materials) (SRMs) En Español PDF Aug 7, 2008

 


 

Thursday, June 26, 2008

 

 *** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

 


 

 Friday, August 8, 2008

 

 *** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

 


 

resolved ??? ($$$)

 

we are still feeding cows to cows in 2013-2014, see OAI’s in link below, December 13, 2013 and 2014.

 

WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.

 

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

 

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

 

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys

 

Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

 

 snip...

 

 BSE bovine brain inoculum

 

 100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

 

 Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

 

 Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

 

 RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

 

 PrPres biochemical detection

 

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

 

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

 

 Published online January 27, 2005

 


 

 It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

 


 

 it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

 


 

 P04.27

 

 Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

 

 Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

 

 Background:

 

 In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

 

 Aims:

 

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

 

 Methods:

 

 Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

 

 Results:

 

 In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

 

Conclusions:

 

 Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

 

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

 


 

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.

 


 

P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

 

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

 

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

 

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.

 

Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

 

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

 

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

***BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY ***

 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

*** price of prion poker goes up again with this study. I strongly urge the United States FDA et al to revisit their failed ruminant mad cow feed ban, where still to this day, the feed ban does NOT include cervids. ...

 

Saturday, January 31, 2015

 

European red deer (Cervus elaphus elaphus) are susceptible to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE by Oral Alimentary route

 


 

*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ?

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

*** What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”

 

The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”

 


 

*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS

 

THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$

 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

 

CODE

 

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

___________________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

 

CODE

 

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

 

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

 

*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA

 

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

 

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

 

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

 

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

 

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

 

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

 

REASON

 

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION AL

 

______________________________

 


 

 PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,

 

Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons

 

DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

 

______________________________

 

PRODUCT

 

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

 

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

 

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

 

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

 

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

 

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

 

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

 

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

 

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

 

###

 


 

 Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

 Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

 

 a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

 

 b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

 

 c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

 

 d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

 

 e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

 

 f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

 

 g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

 

 h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

 

 i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

 

 j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

 

 k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

 

 l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

 

 m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

 

 Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

 

 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

 

 REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

 

 VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

 

 DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

 

 END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

 

 ###

 


 

 MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

 

 RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

 

 ______________________________

 

 PRODUCT

 

 a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

 

 b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

 

 c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

 

 d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

 

 a) Bulk

 

 b) None

 

 c) Bulk

 

 d) Bulk

 

 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 

 REASON

 

 Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

 

 DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

 

 END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

 

 ###

 


 

 please see full text ;

 


 

 THIS IS WHEN THE MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTERS WERE WEEKLY, AND INFORMATIVE FOR THE PUBLIC ;

 

 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

 

 April 9, 2001 WARNING LETTER

 

 01-PHI-12 CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

 

 Brian J. Raymond, Owner Sandy Lake Mills 26 Mill Street P.O. Box 117 Sandy Lake, PA 16145 PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT

 

 Tel: 215-597-4390

 

 Dear Mr. Raymond:

 

 Food and Drug Administration Investigator Gregory E. Beichner conducted an inspection of your animal feed manufacturing operation, located in Sandy Lake, Pennsylvania, on March 23, 2001, and determined that your firm manufactures animal feeds including feeds containing prohibited materials. The inspection found significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, code of Federal Regulations, part 589.2000 - Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. The regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) . Such deviations cause products being manufactured at this facility to be misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(f), of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

 

 Our investigation found failure to label your swine feed with the required cautionary statement "Do Not Feed to cattle or other Ruminants" The FDA suggests that the statement be distinguished by different type-size or color or other means of highlighting the statement so that it is easily noticed by a purchaser.

 

 In addition, we note that you are using approximately 140 pounds of cracked corn to flush your mixer used in the manufacture of animal feeds containing prohibited material. This flushed material is fed to wild game including deer, a ruminant animal. Feed material which may potentially contain prohibited material should not be fed to ruminant animals which may become part of the food chain.

 

 The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of deviations from the regulations. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for assuring that your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. We have enclosed a copy of FDA's Small Entity Compliance Guide to assist you with complying with the regulation... blah, blah, blah...

 


 

SPONTANEOUS

 

 *** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

*** spontaneous atypical BSE ???

 

if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$

 

As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

 


 

so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

 Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

Thursday, July 24, 2014

 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations

 


 

LAST _documented_ MAD COW IN USA, IN CALIFORNIA, WAS ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE TSE PRION DISEASE

 

 Thursday, February 20, 2014

 

 ***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model

 


 

 ***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle

 


 

 ***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 


 

 ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

 


 

 full text ;

 

atypical L-type BASE BSE

 


 

 However, a BSE expert said that consumption of infected material is the only known way that cattle get the disease under natural conditons.

 

*** “In view of what we know about BSE after almost 20 years experience, contaminated feed has been the source of the epidemic,” said Paul Brown, a scientist retired from the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke. BSE is not caused by a microbe. It is caused by the misfolding of the so-called “prion protein” that is a normal constituent of brain and other tissues. If a diseased version of the protein enters the brain somehow, it can slowly cause all the normal versions to become misfolded. It is possible the disease could arise spontaneously, though such an event has never been recorded, Brown said.

 


 

 *** What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.” The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”

 


 

 ATYPICAL BSE CASES AND FEED THERE FROM ;

 

***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

 


 

 2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE BASE CALIFORNIA ‘confirmed’ Saturday, August 4, 2012

 

*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 (atypical L-type BASE BSE)

 


 

 Saturday, August 14, 2010

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

 


 

 2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

 


 

2015

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2015 9:17 AM

 

To: BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG

 

Subject: [BSE-L] Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment

 

Comment from Terry Singeltary This is a Comment on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Notice: Draft Guidance for Industry on Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm; Availability

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Show agency attachment(s) Attachments View All (0)

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Comment View document:

 


 


 

Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment

 

Greetings FDA et al,

 

I wish to comment on Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180.

 

Once again, I wish to kindly bring up the failed attempt of the FDA and the ruminant to ruminant mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997. This feed ban is still failing today, as we speak. Even more worrisome, is the fact it is still legal to feed cervids to cervids in the USA, in fact, the FDA only _recommends_ that deer and elk considered to be of _high_ risk for CWD do not enter the animal food chain, but there is NO law, its only voluntary, a recipe for a TSE prion disaster, as we have seen with the ruminant to ruminant feed ban for cattle, where in 2007, one decade post August 1997 mad cow feed ban, where in 2007 10,000,000 POUNDS OF BANNED BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL WHEN OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. Since 2007, these BSE feed ban rules have been breached time and time again. tons and tons of mad cow feed went out in Alabama as well, where one of the mad cows were documented, just the year before in 2006, and in 2013 and 2014, breaches so bad (OAI) Official Action Indicated were issued. those are like the one issued where 10 million pounds of banned blood laced meat and bone meal were fed out.

 

What is the use of having a Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180, if it cannot be enforced, as we have seen with a mandatory ruminant to ruminant feed ban?

 

I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following reasons...

 

======

 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system.

 

***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

======

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT

 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 0500 EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1

 


 


 

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT SUBMISSION ;

 


 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

*** See attached file(s) No documents available. Attachments View All (1) Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Terry Singeltary Comment View Attachment:

 


 

 Sunday, April 5, 2015

 

*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***

 


 

 Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Show agency attachment(s) Attachments View All (0)

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Comment View document: Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;

 

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

 

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

 

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

 

the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

 

for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

 

lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

 

Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

 

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

 

Country/Year

 

snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS No documents available. Attachments View All (1) Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:

 


 

Saturday, November 10, 2012

 

 Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues

 


 

 Saturday, July 23, 2011

 

 CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE

 


 

 Sunday, October 18, 2009

 

 Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009

 


 

 Thursday, October 15, 2009

 

 Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009

 


 

 Thursday, June 26, 2008

 

 *** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

 


 

 Tuesday, July 1, 2008

 

 Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

 


 

 Friday, August 8, 2008

 

 *** Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

 


 

 Saturday, April 5, 2008

 

 SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

 


 

 Wednesday, April 30, 2008

 

 Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings

 


 

 Wednesday, April 30, 2008

 

 Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings

 


 

 Friday, October 15, 2010

 

 BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle

 


 

 SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs

 


 

 Thursday, November 18, 2010

 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

 

 Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in restitution.

 


 


 

 Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

 

 Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

 

 An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

 

 snip...

 

 Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

 

 soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

 

 implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

 

 snip...

 

 The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

 

 4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

 


 

 -MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona

 

 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs

 

 February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

 

 CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

 

 PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

 

 Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

 

 Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

 

 (a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

 

 (b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

 

 (c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

 

 (d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

 

 (e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

 

 (f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

 

 Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #

 


 

 WE can only hope that this is a single incident. BUT i have my doubts. I remember when the infamous TOKEN Purina Feed Mill in Texas was feeding up to 5.5 grams of potentially and probably tainted BANNED RUMINANT feed to cattle, and the FDA was bragging at the time that the amount of potentially BANNED product was so little and the cattle were so big ;

 

 "It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated."

 


 

 On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. ... FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

 


 

 WE now know all that was a lie. WE know that literally Thousands of TONS of BANNED and most likely tainted product is still going out to commerce. WE know now and we knew then that .005 to a gram was lethal. WE know that CWD infected deer and elk, scrapie infected sheep, BSE and BASE infected cattle have all been rendered and fed back to livestock (including cattle) for human and animal consumption.

 

 Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'', and this was on March 15, 2006 ;

 

 "The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

 

 Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

 

 USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

 

 "Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

 


 

 CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

 


 

 PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

 

 Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

 

 "Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

 

 OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

 

 Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

 


 

 Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds

 

 Animal

 

 Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and other meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and animal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products

 

 snip...

 

 Conclusions

 

 Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections (antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health officials.

 

 REFERENCES...snip...end

 

 Sapkota et al. 668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives

 


 

 Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

 TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on paper $$$

 

 full text ;

 


 

 Friday, January 23, 2015

 

 Replacement of soybean meal in compound feed by European protein sources and relaxing the mad cow ban $

 


 

 Wednesday, October 30, 2013

 

SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL (SRM) CONTROL VERIFICATION TASK FSIS NOTICE 70-13 10/30/13

 


 

*** Singeltary Submission

 

Owens, Julie

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98

 


 

*** FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY ***

 


 

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

 

MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada "Three of four possible manufacturers supplying a protein supplement likely fed to the animal could have included meat and bone meal (MBM) as an ingredient in its formulation. One of these manufacturers was able to confirm usage of meat and bone meal in supplements and confirm a source of MBM to be one common to previous BSE investigations."

 

USA AND CANADA IMPORTS OF UK CATTLE BETWEEN 1981 - 1989

 

USA = 496

 

CANADA = 198

 

*add 14 to 198 as last UK import to Canada, 14 in 1990

 


 

 HERE is another look at all the imports for both the USA and Canada of UK live cattle and greaves exports ;

 

UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96

 

USA 697 LIVE CATTLE

 

CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE

 


 

 

 

UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 - 1995

 

USA 24 TONS

 

CANADA 83 TONS

 


 

 HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS

 

Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.??? From: S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000 To: flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)

 

Terry

 

Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves. UK exports of this to the US are listed below:

 

Country Tonnes

 

1980

 

1981 12

 

1982

 

1983

 

1984 10

 

1985 2

 

1986

 

1987

 

1988

 

1989 20

 

1990

 

 Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222). Best wishes Simon Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

 

============ END...TSS...2008============

 


 

 

 

LETS start with the UKBSEnvCJD only theory, lets look at UK exports to USA, Canada, and Mexico. the imported only theory. ...

 

1994 UK EXPORTS BEEF VEAL USA , MEXICO $ CANADA ONLY other Countries list in PDF file)

 

USA -------- TOTALS ''8'' TONS CANADA -- TOTALS ''29'' TONS

 

1995 UK EXPORT BEEF AND VEAL TO USA AND CANADA

 

USA ------- TOTALS ''358'' TONS

 

CANADA --TOTALS ''24'' TONS

 

BONE-IN BEEF AND VEAL

 

USA-------- TOTALS ''10'' TONS (i think this is part of the 358 tons above?)

 

UK EXPORT OF LIKE CATTLE TO USA AND CANADA

 

1986 TO 1996 USA TOTAL = 1297

 

1986 TO 1996 CAN TOTAL = 299

 


 

UK EXPORT MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS DEC 1987

 

CANADA -- 64,526 KG

 

UK EXPORT OFFALS OF BOVINE ANIMALS FRESH CHILLED OR FROZEN OTHER THAN LIVER DEC 1987 YTD

 

USA -- 45,943 KG

 

UK EXPORT MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMAL WITH BONE IN 1988

 

CANADA -- 4,163 KG

 

PREP OR PRES MEAT OR OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS CUMULATIVE TO DEC 1988

 

USA -------- 28,609 KG CANADA -- 22,044 KG

 

MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS WITH BONE IN CUMULATIVE TO ANUAL 1989

 

USA -------- 17,880 KG MEXICO---- 33,444 KG

 

BONELESS MEAT OF BOVINE 1989

 

USA --------111,953 KG CANADA---1,800 KG MEXICO --- 1,143,387 KG

 

EDIBLE OFFAL OF BOVINE ANIMALS 1989

 

USA -------- 19,980 KG MEXICO--- 31,244 KG

 

MORE........

 

MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS BONELESS 1990

 

USA 146,443

 


 

 

 

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS, USA, CANADA, AND MEXICO

 

 EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)

 

Summary of the Scientific Report

 

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

 

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

 

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

 

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

 


 


 

 EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of Canada

 

Summary of the Scientific Report

 

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

 

The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.

 

A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

 

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

 


 


 

 

 

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of Mexico

 

Last updated: 8 September 2004 Publication Date: 20 August 2004

 

Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)

 

Summary of the Scientific Report

 

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

 

The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge around 1993.

 

It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of imported ‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live ‘at - risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system.

 

EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.

 


 


 

Subject: MBM (MEAT AND BONE MEAL) imports from the United Kingdom to??? 'EVERYWHERE', including the U.S. Date: April 10, 2000 at 1:31 pm PST

 

69. On 14 February 1990, Mr Meldrum wrote a letter to the Chief Veterinary Officers of a number of countries. [76] On 15 February 1990, Mrs Attridge and other officials were sent a copy of the letter of 14 February 1990 and a list of the countries to which it had been sent. They were stated to be the countries which had imported ruminant based meat and bone meal from the United Kingdom.

 

The countries listed were Norway; Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Nigeria, Thailand, South Africa, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Canada, USA, Turkey, Kenya, Malta, Libera, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Puerto Rico, Curacao, Finland.[77]

 

The letter from Mr Meldrum included the following:

 

‘Although we have kept the Office Internationale des Epizooties (OIE) fully informed about this new disease, and they will shortly be disseminating information and recommendations to member countries, I am writing to you on a personal basis to ensure that you are aware of all the developments in relation to BSE, including its likely cause. The majority of our findings have now been published in the Veterinary Record.’[78] 70. On 20 February 1990, Dr Pickles wrote to Ms Verity (APS/CMO). Dr Pickles’ minute included the following:

 

‘1. Mr Meldrum is arguing that MAFF have already taken all the necessary and responsible steps to warn importing countries of the BSE dangers in UK meat and bone meal. Yet the action taken so far overseas suggest the message has not got through, or where it has this has been late. The first nation that woke up to the danger did so a year after our own feed ban. It seems even now several EC countries neither ban our imports or the general feeding of ruminant protein. It also seems the OIE and CVO have yet to inform the rest of the world.

 

2. I do not see how this can be claimed to be ‘responsible’. We do not need an expert group of the Scientific Veterinary Committee to tell us British meat and bone meal is unsafe for ruminants. I fail to understand why this cannot be tackled from the British end which seems to be the only sure way of doing it, preferably by banning exports. As CMO says in his letter of 3 January ‘surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.’’[79] 71. Dr Pickles attached a draft reply for the CMO to send to Mr Meldrum. The draft letter included the following:

 

‘I was pleased to hear of your action to inform nations overseas about the causation of BSE and the measures needed to prevent infection in their own cattle. But the evidence of action taken so far suggests other nations have not fully appreciated the possible hazards from our meat and bone meal, since only a few nations have either banned our imports or the more general feeding of ruminant material. It is in the knowledge that several other nations have yet to take adequate steps that I questioned whether we should be restricting exports. Your reply does not convince me that everything possible has already been done. [We are meeting on the 22nd February and our discussions are to include BSE. We could debate this further then]. [We have discussed this matter further at our recent meeting. Our view remains that restricting exports would be the right course of action.]’[80] 72.

 

On 22 February 1990 Mr Andrews held a meeting with Sir Christopher France, Sir Donald Acheson and Mr Heppell from the Department of Health;

 

Mr Dickinson and Mr Meldrum from MAFF were present. Mr Robinson (PS/Mr Andrews) minuted Mr Dickinson on 27 February 1990 about this meeting.[81] The minute stated in paragraph 18: ‘Sir Donald Acheson asked whether meat and bone meal that was exported should be labelled. Mr Meldrum said that he had now written to his opposite number in our trading partners. He had told them that the UK had imposed a ban, and importing countries must make their own decisions. We had not wanted to introduce a ban on exports since we were content to feed it to pigs and poultry. He was certain that other countries were fully aware of the situation in the UK.’ 73.

 

On 27 February 1990, Dr McInnes (PS/CMO) wrote to Dr Pickles. The minute was entitled ‘BSE and exports of Meat and Bone Meal’ and contained the following: ‘You very kindly provided a draft letter for CMO to sent to Mr Meldrum on this subject. I understand from CMO that this was in fact discussed at their recent meeting and CMO has therefore decided not to pursue this question.’[82] 74.

 

When Dr Pickles gave oral evidence, the following exchange took place:

 

‘MR THOMAS: Do the points put forward by Mr Meldrum in that meeting in this note answer the concerns you had put forward previously?

 

DR PICKLES: I do not think they do. MR THOMAS: Can I ask you to expand as to why not?

 

DR PICKLES: He was reiterating the same arguments I had had previously. He was certain other countries were fully aware of the situation in the UK, or maybe their chief veterinary officers were. I was more concerned to know whether the importers of MBM and their compounders and farmers knew about it.

 

MR THOMAS: Do you recall any discussion of the CMO's decision not to pursue the question further?

 

DR PICKLES: I do not think I had discussion, no.’[83] 75.

 

A supplemental statement from Mr Meldrum includes the following: ‘… steps were taken to ensure that information was provided on an international basis about BSE and the control measures introduced in the UK, including the ruminant feed ban. I was fully aware that the reports of all the meetings of the OIE Commissions in the languages of the OIE were circulated to all the member countries shortly after the meetings had taken place. Examples of countries reacting to the information about BSE that was widely available can be seen in letters dated 21st June, 1988 (YB88/6.21/15.1) and 3rd February, 1989 (YB89/2.3/5.1) from me to Israel's Director of Veterinary Services and Animal Health, a letter dated 11th October, 1988 (YB88/10.11/4.1-4.4) from me to Cyprus' Director of Veterinary Services, a letter dated 3rd February, 1989 (YB89/2.03/6.1) from me to Finland's Director of Veterinary Services and a letter dated 6th December, 1988 (YB88/12.6/5.1-5.2)from Mr Hawkins to the Dairy Farmers' Association of Japan.

 

I particularly wish to draw attention to the question and answer brief for importing countries which is attached to the letter to Cyprus' Director of Veterinary Services (YB88/10.11/4.2-4.4).

 

Also a minute dated 3rd October, 1988 (YB88/10.3/7.1-7.4) from Mr Crawford to me describes a visit by Mr Crawford to the USA to meet staff at the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. As item number 7 of the minute shows, Mr Crawford gave a summary of BSE and the measures taken by MAFF to ‘investigate and eradicate it’(YB88/10.3/7.3).’[84] 76. A supplemental statement provided by Mr Meldrum includes a section relating to notification of the ruminant feed ban to non-EC countries which concludes with the following:

 

‘… it can be seen that non-EC countries were kept informed of the existence of BSE and the hypothesis on the role of meat and bone meal in the disease and of the subsequent introduction of the ruminant feed ban in the UK. As I maintained throughout the period from when I took over as CVO (1st June, 1988) until my letter to the CVOs of third countries on 14th February, 1990 (YB90/2.15/3.1-3.4), importing third countries (both EC and non-EC) had sufficient information to make their own decisions as to whether or not to impose their own restrictions on imports of meat and bone meal from the UK.

 

*** It is also pertinent to note that so far as I am aware none of the 25 countries to whom I wrote in February 1990 banned the import of animal protein from the UK and none complained that they had not been informed of BSE through the OIE. ***

 

This is hardly surprising because one of the main reasons for the existence of the OIE is to disseminate information about outbreaks of disease amongst the member countries. I had great faith in the OIE and believe that its record in the dissemination of information about outbreaks of both established and emerging diseases is above criticism.’[85]

 


 

 

‘’AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization.’’

 

 

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

 

OIE and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reinforce Collaboration

 


 

 

UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD

 


 


 


 

OTHERS

 

BEEF AND VEAL

 


 


 


 

LIVE CATTLE

 


 

FATS

 


 

EMBRYOS

 


 

GELATIN ETC

 


 

SEMEN

 


 

MEAT

 


 

 Wednesday, April 16, 2008 MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada

 


 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

 *** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

 


 

 Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

 *** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

 Tuesday, April 01, 2014

 

 *** Questions linger in U.S. CJD cases 2005, and still do in 2014

 


 

 Monday, March 29, 2010

 

 CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER

 

 URGENT, PLEASE NOTE ;

 

 >>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<

 


 


 

 CJD NE TEXAS CLUSTER

 

 Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Northeast Texas

 

 J.A. Rawlings,*1 K.A. Hendricks1, O.M. Nuno1, D.A. Brown1, D.A. Evans2, Texas Department of Health, 1Austin and 2Tyler, T

 

exas Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD), a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, is caused by prions composed of proteinaceous material devoid of nucleic acid. CJD occurs sporadically (generally 1 case/1,000,000 population per year) in older patients (average age of 65) and is characterized by rapidly progressive dementia, accompanied by severe muscle spasms and incoordination. Death usually occurs within 3 to 12 months (average 7 months). CJD activity in Texas, which has a population of nearly 19 million, appeared to be typical. The statewide death rate for 1995 and 1996 was just under 1/1,000,000. In April of 1997, the Texas Department of Health became aware of an increased number of possible CJD cases in a 23-county area of NE Texas with a population of just over one million. After review of medical and pathology records, four patients were identified with definite classic CJD and three were identified with probable CJD. Dates of death for the eight patients were from April, 1996 through mid-July 1997. The patients were from 46 through 65 years of age; four were male and three were female. A case-control study to identify risks for CJD in NE Texas has been initiated.

 


 

 we get them young cases of tse prion disease in Texas, that is not related to anything $$$ money and politics will buy anything, especially junk science... sporadic ffi and sporadic gss ;

 

 NOT THIS CASE !!! but another one a while back in Texas...see ;

 

 We report a case of a 33-year-old female who died of a prion disease for whom the diagnosis of sFI or FFI was not considered clinically. Following death of this patient, an interview with a close family member indicated the patient's illness included a major change in her sleep pattern, corroborating the reported autopsy diagnosis of sFI.

 


 

 sporadic FFI or nvCJD Texas style ???

 


 

 Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance in Texas

 


 

 Sunday, July 11, 2010

 

 CJD or prion disease 2 CASES McLennan County Texas population 230,213 both cases in their 40s

 


 


 

 ***In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

 


 

 Monday, May 19, 2014

 

 Variant CJD: 18 years of research and surveillance

 


 

 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis

 


 


 


 

 full text with source references ;

 


 

 re-Human Prion Diseases in the United States

 

 Posted by flounder on 01 Jan 2010 at 18:11 GMT

 


 

 Views & Reviews

 

 Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

 

 Ermias D. Belay, MD, Ryan A. Maddox, MPH, Pierluigi Gambetti, MD and Lawrence B. Schonberger, MD

 

 + Author Affiliations

 

 From the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases (Drs. Belay and Schonberger and R.A. Maddox), National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA; and National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (Dr. Gambetti), Division of Neuropathology, Institute of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH.

 

 Address correspondence and reprint requests to Dr. Ermias D. Belay, 1600 Clifton Road, Mailstop A-39, Atlanta, GA 30333.

 


 

 26 March 2003

 

 Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) CJD WATCH

 

 I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

 


 

 Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

 

 Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

 To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

 

 Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

 

 1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT

 


 


 

 2 January 2000

 

 British Medical Journal

 

 U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well

 


 

 15 November 1999

 

 British Medical Journal

 

 vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.

 


 

 Saturday, January 2, 2010

 

 Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

 


 

 14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

 

 Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

 

 Session: International Scientific Exchange

 

 Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

 

 T. Singeltary

 

 Bacliff, TX, USA

 

 Background:

 

 An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

 

 Methods:

 

 12 years independent research of available data

 

 Results:

 

 I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

 

 Conclusion:

 

 I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

 


 

 *** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

 

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

 

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics

 

Abstract

 

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human ​prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 

Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance

 


 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

Suspect symptoms

 

What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected with scrapie?

 

28 Mar 01 Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.

 

Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.

 

"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been caused by eating infected mutton or lamb...

 

2001

 

Suspect symptoms

 

What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected with scrapie?

 

28 Mar 01

 

Like lambs to the slaughter

 

31 March 2001

 

by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284.

 

FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.

 

Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.

 

"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.

 

Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.

 

Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same symptoms.

 

As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.

 

"The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys. "You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie." In the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were dissimilar.

 

But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. "You would not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.

 

People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously deforms to produce sCJD.

 

But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as it is in vCJD. "If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were caused by infection."

 

There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence elsewhere. Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have insisted.

 

Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.

 


 

Friday, February 20, 2015

 

APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays 2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015

 


 

Thursday, March 20, 2014

 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION OF CERVID AND THE POTENTIAL FOR HUMAN TRANSMISSION THEREFROM 2014

 


 

Tuesday, July 01, 2014

 

*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE, GAME FARMS, AND POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS THERE FROM ***

 


 

Thursday, July 03, 2014

 

*** How Chronic Wasting Disease is affecting deer population and what’s the risk to humans and pets? ***

 


 

Thursday

 

CWD TO HUMANS, AND RISK FACTORS THERE FROM (see latest science)

 

Tuesday, November 04, 2014

 

*** Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes 2005–2011

 


 

Friday, January 30, 2015

 

*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***

 


 

Sunday, April 12, 2015

 

*** Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2014 Annual Report ***

 


 

Saturday, April 11, 2015

 

*** ISU veterinary researchers study retinal scans as early detection method for mad cow disease

 


 

Sunday, November 23, 2014

 

*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***

 


 

Monday, November 3, 2014

 

USA CJD TSE PRION UNIT, TEXAS, SURVEILLANCE UPDATE NOVEMBER 2014

 

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (October 7, 2014)

 

***6 Includes 11 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 19 inconclusive cases;

 

***7 Includes 12 (11 from 2014) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

 

***The sporadic cases include 2660 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD),

 

***50 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr)

 

***and 21 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI).

 


 

Thursday, January 15, 2015

 

41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE Prion: Case Report

 


 

Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type disease

 

what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.

 

why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping everything the USDA inc says.

 

sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.

 

My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.

 

with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how many bodies is this market worth?

 

Saturday, January 17, 2015

 

*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

 


 

*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December 14, 2014 Report ***

 


 

Tuesday, November 04, 2014

 

Towards an Age-Dependent Transmission Model of Acquired and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 


 

Thursday, January 22, 2015

 

Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to disease etiology?

 


 


 

Sunday, July 06, 2014

 

Dietary Risk Factors for Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: A Confirmatory Case-Control Study

 

Conclusions—The a priori hypotheses were supported.

 

*Consumption of various meat products may be one method of transmission of the infectious agent for sCJD.

 


 

PLEASE REMEMBER ;

 

The Akron, Ohio-based CJD Foundation said the Center for Disease Control revised that number in October of 2004 to about one in 9,000 CJD cases per year in the population group age 55 and older.

 

HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ASKING REAL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO ROUTE AND SOURCE OF THE TSE AGENT THAT KILLED YOUR LOVED ONE ???

 

if not, why not...

 

Friday, November 30, 2007

 

CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION

 


 


 

Friday, January 10, 2014

 

vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???

 


 


 

Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease

 

Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3, 2014

 


 

Singeltary comment ;

 


 

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease

 


 

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

 

KURU Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease

 


 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis VIDEO

 


 


 


 


 

Saturday, December 13, 2014

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

 

snip...

 


 

 

 2001-2002ish

 

 greetings TSE PRION WORLD,

 

 i am reminded of a few things deep throat told me years ago;

 

 *** The most frightening thing I have read all day is the report of Gambetti's finding of a new strain of sporadic cjd in young people.........

 

 Dear God, what in the name of all that is holy is that!!! If the US has different strains of scrapie..... why???? than the UK... then would the same mechanisms that make different strains of scrapie here make different strains of BSE... if the patterns are different in sheep and mice for scrapie..... could not the BSE be different in the cattle, in the mink, in the humans....... I really think the slides or tissues and everything from these young people with the new strain of sporadic cjd should be put up to be analyzed by many, many experts in cjd........ bse..... scrapie

 

 Scrape the damn slide and put it into mice..... wait..... chop up the mouse brain and and spinal cord........ put into some more mice..... dammit amplify the thing and start the damned research..... This is NOT rocket science... we need to use what we know and get off our butts and move.... the whining about how long everything takes..... well it takes a whole lot longer if you whine for a year and then start the research!!!

 

 Not sure where I read this but it was a recent press release or something like that: I thought I would fall out of my chair when I read about how there was no worry about infectivity from a histopath slide or tissues because they are preserved in formic acid, or formalin or formaldehyde..... for God's sake........ Ask any pathologist in the UK what the brain tissues in the formalin looks like after a year....... it is a big fat sponge... the agent continues to eat the brain ...... you can't make slides anymore because the agent has never stopped........ and the old slides that are stained with Hemolysin and Eosin...... they get holier and holier and degenerate and continue... what you looked at 6 months ago is not there........ Gambetti better be photographing every damned thing he is looking at.....

 

 ***Okay, you need to know. You don't need to pass it on as nothing will come of it and there is not a damned thing anyone can do about it. Don't even hint at it as it will be denied and laughed at.......... USDA is gonna do as little as possible until there is actually a human case in the USA of the nvcjd........ if you want to move this thing along and shake the earth.... then we gotta get the victims families to make sure whoever is doing the autopsy is credible, trustworthy, and a saint with the courage of Joan of Arc........ I am not kidding!!!! so, unless we get a human death from EXACTLY the same form with EXACTLY the same histopath lesions as seen in the UK nvcjd........ forget any action........ it is ALL gonna be sporadic!!! And, if there is a case....... there is gonna be every effort to link it to international travel, international food, etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. They will go so far as to find out if a sex partner had ever traveled to the UK/europe, etc. etc. .... It is gonna be a long, lonely, dangerous twisted journey to the truth. They have all the cards, all the money, and are willing to threaten and carry out those threats.... and this may be their biggest downfall...***

 

 Thanks as always for your help. (Recently had a very startling revelation from a rather senior person in government here.......... knocked me out of my chair........ you must keep pushing. If I was a power person.... I would be demanding that there be at least a million bovine tested as soon as possible and agressively seeking this disease. The big players are coming out of the wood work as there is money to be made!!!

 

 In short: "FIRE AT WILL"!!! for the very dumb.... who's "will"! "Will be the burden to bare if there is any coverup!"

 

 again it was said years ago and it should be taken seriously.... BSE will NEVER be found in the US!

 

 As for the BSE conference call... I think you did agreat service to freedom of information and making some people feign integrity... I find it scary to see that most of the "experts" are employed by the federal government or are supported on the "teat" of federal funds. A scary picture! I hope there is a confidential panel organized by the new government to really investigate this thing.

 

 You need to watch your back........ but keep picking at them....... like a buzzard to the bone... you just may get to the truth!!! (You probably have more support than you know. Too many people are afraid to show you or let anyone else know. I have heard a few things myself... you ask the questions that everyone else is too afraid to ask.)

 

 ================================================

 

 

 *** U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 SINGELTARY

 


 


 

 

 

 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

 

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

Subscribe to Post Comments [Atom]

Links to this post:

Create a Link

<< Home